Since May 1991 Since the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act (ECA), lockouts have become a much more prominent feature of New Zealand's industrial relations landscape, and a considerably more popular element of ẽmployers' industrial relations armoury. It will be argued here that this trend is a product of the ECA' s deregulated and decentralised bargaining framework, which, combined with the definition of lockout inherited from the Labour Relations Act (LRA), has led to a body of case law establishing the lockout, and in particular the so-called "partial lockout" whereby selected portions of employees' contracts are breached, as an ẽxtremely powerful tool in employers' hands. As a consequenc,e, the tenet of industrial law espoused by Colgan J in Designoower and quoted above :no longer reflects the reality of industrial relations, and the balance of power has swung funily in favour of employers.
Since the 1987 Labour Relations Act, Parliament has recognised the right of workers to strike and employers to lock out, free of the tmeat of civil action, in certain closely defined circumstances. These tools of industrial bargaining are, in theory, equal and counterbalancing, giving employers and employees limited right to bring coercive pressure to bear on the opposite party.
As Colgan J commented in NZ Public Service . Association v Design power NZ Ltd 16/4/92 WEC 17N92:
It is .. . noteworthy that the power to lawfully lockout employees is o~ten said ' lO be the mirror image of and quid pro quo of dte right or power of employees to str&e to the same end Since the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act (ECA), lockouts have become a much more prominent feature of New Zealand's industrial relations landscape, and a considerably more popular element of ẽmployers' industrial relations armoury. It will be argued here that this trend is a product of the ECA' s deregulated and decentralised bargaining framework, which, combined with the definition of lockout inherited from the Labour Relations Act (LRA) , has led to a body of case law establishing the lockout, and in particular the so-called "partial lockout" whereby selected portions of employees' contracts are breached, as an ẽxtremely powerful tool in employers' hands. As a consequenc,e, the tenet of industrial law espoused by Colgan J in Designoower and quoted above :no longer reflects the reality of industrial relations, and the balance of power has swung funily in favour of employers.
The role of lockouts prior to the ECA Despitẽ New Zealand's industrial relations climate being marred by conflict, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s (Brosnan et aL, 1990) , employers were generally loathe to use the lockout tool. Hughes (1990) noted that lockouts had historically been of Jittle significance in New Zealand labour law, and that this had been explained on the basis that employers were restrained from using the lockout weapon by the obligation, until 1981, to pay wages to locked out workers, or because of ẽmployers' concern for their workers' welfare. A more significant reason for the relative dearth of case law on lockouts, argued Hughes, was the restrictive definition of lockout which comprised both the employers' action and its motive, and the consequent difficulty of proving a lockout had occurred.
Such case law as did develop prior to the ECA did, however, hint at the unrealised power of the lockout weapon. The notion that a lockout could be something other than a literal locking of the factory gates was well established under the LRA. In NZ Dairy Food and Texti.le Workers, Union v Cavalier B~emworth Ltd [1991] 2ERNZ (WLC32), the union successfully alleged the employer's action in imposing a new shift system on workers was a lockout In NZ Seamens, JUOW & Federated Cooks and Stewards' Union . etc 
v Shipping
Corporation of . New Zealand [1989] 1 NZll.,R 6, the idea that a mass dismissal could constitute a lockout was recognised. The Public Service Association, in NZ Pub. lic Service Association v Armourguard Rescue Services Ltd [1989] 3 NZII~R 343, recognised by implication the conoept of the "partial lockout" by arguing (unsuccessfully) that the introduction of a new rescue frre appliance befo~e the customary consultativ· e discussions on manning had been held was a lockout. Similarly, in NZ Ai~l.ine Pilots, Association v Air New Zealand [1991] 2 ERNZ (AEC35), the plaintiff union argued (again, unsuccessfully) that the airline's requirement that pilots be clean-shaven was a lockout. It is noteworthy that in ẽach of these cases the employer argued its action was not a lockou~ including in the Shipping Corporation case where the lockout was held to be lawful. In contras~ in the leading cases on lockouts under the ECA the employer has expressly ensured its actions fell within the definition of lockout. This points to a new consciousness among employers of the potency of the lockout which was absent prior to the 1991 Act.
It is arguable that in the climate of high inflation that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s employers did not need to resort to lockouts to achieve their aims. For example, in the 1989 and 1990 wage rounds under the LRA, wage settlements were markedly below the rate of inflation . . The 1989 wage round followed a 4.5% path, while inflation for the December 1989 quaner · was 7.2%, and in 1990 the Council of Trade Unions-Labour Government "growth agreement .. kept most workers in the collective bargaining system to a 2% pay rise, while inflation for the . December quarter that year ran at 4.8%. Analysis by Harbridge of the five wage rounds between 1984 and 1988/89 showed neither awalid nor non-award settlements had kept pace with inflation as measured by the CPI, largely because the · effects of GST had not been compensated for (Harbridge, 1990) .
But the wage attrition caused by inflation during this period did not address the many other issues which arose as key employer concerns during the very difficult trading conditions of the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. For example, following the deregulation of shop trading hours in 1989 there was ẽnottnous pressure from retail employers, confronted with heightẽned competition and a depressed retail trading environment, for cuts to w· eekend penal rates. Y· et there was no attẽmpt to enforoe these demands through the use of lockouts.
The same observation could be made about other sectors of the economy during this period -among others, the hotel, transport, stores, education sectors -where employers sought major concessions on such issues as penal mtes, hours of work and the use of casual workers.
The historical rarity of lockouts was noted by Geare (1988) , who suggested:
"Lockouts are so few in number because there is rarely any need for employers to use a lockout -even if they warn a stoppage of work. If they really ' Want a stoppage, then in practically all cases ' they can trigger a strike ẽilher by their , actions or by their refusal to act."
A , more important reason. and one which will be explored later in this paper, liẽs in the influence of the highly regulated and centralised system of award bargaining, which , captured 79% of all unionised private sector workers and 52% of unionised public sector employees in 1989/90 (Harbridge, 1991) . The practicalitiẽs of this system meant that for lockouts to be effective employers would have had to act in a highly organised and disciplined manner, but the system itself militated against this degree of cohesion.. As has often been commented, the process of award bargaining was relatively remote from most employers, who by and large accepted the outcome as a fait accompli. Indeed, for many employers the system had benefits: Harbridge (1991, supra) notẽd that the award system provided low wage outcomes and low transaction costs for ẽmployers, and McAndrew and Hursthouse ( 1990) found "little overt dissatisfaction with patterns of interaction between employers and unions. , and relativẽly little dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the existing system." ' Therefore, it is arguable that lockouts were rare in the pre-ECA , environment because ẽmployers lacked the necessary motivation.
The l991 Act: the new order ' To test the proposition that the ECA has made the lockout a more accessible and effective weapon than it was under the LRA, it is necessary first to canvass the relevant provisions of both statutes.
The statutory definition of lockout in s62 of the ECA is identical to the LRA 's definition at s232. A lockout is the act of an employer in closing, suspending, or discontinuing all or part of its business, or wholly or partially discontinuing the employment of any workers, or in breaking some or all of its contracts of service, or in refusing to engage workers nonnally engaged by the employer, with a viẽw 'to compelling any workers, or to aid any other employer to compel workers, 'to accept terms of employment or to comply with any demands made by the employer.
The circumstances in which S' trikes and lockouts are unlawful and lawful ~e laid out in ECA s63 and s64 respectively. Section 63 makes unlawful any strike or lockout which occurs while a collective employment contract (CEC) relating to the employees involvẽd is in force; or if it relates to a dispute or a personal grievance; or to any matter dealt with under Part I (freedom of association) of the ECA; or if the action concerns whether more than one employer will be bound by a CEC; or if the requifed notice provisions in essential services have not been complied with. Strikes and lockouts are lawful under the ECA if they are not unlawful under s63, and if they relate to the negotiation of a CEC for the ẽmployees concerned.
The countẽrparts to these sections under the LRA were s223 and s234. The principal differences between the two statutes are that the LRA allowed strikes and lockouts over disputes of intefest when the relevant award or agreement had no more than 60 days until it expired, or if they related to a "new matter" (a concept absent from the ECA), or to the negotiation of a redundancy agreement. The LRA rendered unlawful strikes and lockouts over disputes, personal grievances, demarcation disputes, union membership or change of union coverage, cancellation of union registration, or where the action occurred more than 60 days before the expiry of the relevant award or agreement, or in ẽssential industries where the notice requirements had not been met. The ECA mirrors the LRA's provision that strikes and lockouts on health and safety grounds are not unlawful. Hence, the ECA 's lockout provisions owe much to the LRA. In practice, however, profound differences have emerged in te1n1s of employers' willingness and ability to use lockouts to effect change. The reason for this lies in the interplay between the ECA 's lockout provisions and its bargaining framework.
The ECA has shifted industrial relations from a · Corporatist model to a contractualist model (Chmchman, 1991) . It provides for individual and collective · contracts which bind only the individual employers and employees who are dirẽct parties to the contracts. Collective contracts remain in force as collective instruments only until their expiry dates. Unless a new CEC is negotiated, e. mployees are automatically deemed to be on individual employment contracts (IECs) which incorporate the tetrns of the expired CE· C. Union membership is voluntary and unions have no special status in the industrial process. Workers may select any bargaining agent -not necessarily a union -to ~epresent them, or they may represent themselves. The employer must recognise its workers' authorised bargaining agents, but the ECA does not compel it to negotiate with those agents. The bargaining proc· ess itself is non-prescriptive, and can take any course the parties choose. The E· CA is neutral as to whether settlements are achieved, and leaves the negotiation of employment contracts entirely in the hands of the panies.
In contrast, the LRA provided for awanls to bind all workers and ẽmployers in the industry or occupation to which the document applied, and for agreements to bind all workers whose employers were signatories. Unions, rather than individual workers, were parties to awards and agreements, and unions had recognised bargaining rights on behalf of workers. The LRA provided for awards and agreements to remain in force as collective documents for up to three years beyond their expiry dates. Compulsory union membership under awards and agreements could be achieved either by ballot of workers or agreement with the ẽmployer negotiators, and unions had exclusive coverage rights over workers captured by their membership rules. The negotiation of awai!ds was highly regulated through the process of compulsory conciliation, whereby employer and union advocates fotrned conciliation councils chaired by mediators employed by the Government Mediation Service. If negotiations broke down, the dispute would be referred to the Arbitration Commission, which would endeavour to get the parties back to the bargaining table or, if requested by both parries, could arbitrate a settlement.
The LRA also provided for agreements, which were achieved by voluntary negotiation and bound only the employers and unions who actually negotiated them. However, until the 1990 Labour Relations Amendment Act, unions had exclusive power to cite employẽrs out of award coverage for negotiations for a separate agreement The amendment gave employers with more than 50 workers power to initiate the citing out process. In common with the ECA, the L. RA, up until the 1990 amendment, contained no provision for compulsory arbitration, although the 1990 amendment introduced compulsory final offer arbitration in circumstances where protracted negotiations had failed to achieve a settlement The outcome of this radical change in the bargaining process has been a rapid shift from large, multi-employer awards to a predominance of enterprise-based contracts (Harbridge and Moulder, 1992) . It is in the context of the ECA's decentralised, face to face mode of bargaining that the effective power of the lockout has been magnified.
Lockõuts under the Employment Contracts Act
The ftrSt case of imponance in testing this proposition is Prendergast v Associated Stevedores [1991] 2ERNZ (AEC20). This followed an earlier decision of the Labour Court (sitting as the Employment Tribunal) between the same parties, which held that the provisions of the employees' expired award restricting the use of casual labour by the employer fotrned part of their IECs under sl9(4) of the ECA. Following that decision, the employer notified the employees that it intended bfeaching, under s62(l)(c), the provisions of their IECs relating to the use of casual labour, until they agreed to a new CEC which eliminated the very provisions it intended breaching, and to which the Waterfront Workers' Union was not a pany. Rejecting the employees' pleas for compliance orders, interim and pe1n1anent injunctions, Travis J held that the employer had been using a "legitimate tool of industrial relations, namely the threat of a lockout", to strengthen its bargaining position.
This case, then, established that ẽmployers who failed to achieve what they wanted through negotiations for a CEC could lawfully impose the specific changes they sought under the protection of s62(l)(c). This fotin of action, conveniently dubbed the "partial lockout"' because it amounts to something less than a litẽral locking out of the ẽmployees from their place of work, was further developed in Paul and Ors v NZ Society for the Intellectually , Handicapped Inc 15/1/92 WEC 1/92 W 127/91. The IHC, faced with a financial crisis, was seeking two CECs covering different sections of its workforce, and wanted changes to its employees' tetms and conditions to achieve significant cost savings for the organisation. When negotiations with the ẽmployees' bargaining agent failed to yield agreement, IHC notified the employees it intended breaching those provisions of their IECs that it wanted eliminated from the proposed CEC. They were told the action would savẽ the IHC $4.2 million within six months, and that it was being taken ' with a view to compelling them ~o accept new tetnls of employment.
Unlike the Prendergast case, the IHC action threa~ened to have an immediate impact on employees' wage packets. They claimed the action was a breach of their IECs and sought from the Employment Court a compliance oroer and injunction restraining IHC from committing the br:eaches. Castle J found rnC's action was a lockout under s62(1)(c) in that "fundamental tettns" of the employees' contracts had ' been breached. The lockout related to the negotiation of a CEC and was therefo11e lawful under s64 (l)(b). In using the "fundamental terms" test of whether the employees' contracts had been breached, Castle J drew on the Armourguard case (supra), heard under the LRA. In that case, which concerned whether the employer's action in introducing a new rescue frre appliance prior to customary consultative discussions with the union was a lockout, and if so whether it · was unlawful,
If the [new flre appliance] is introduced, and ' the respondent requires the workers to operate il, would lhat requirement be so fundamental a breach of the contract of employment at present in existence between the parties as to entitle the workers ~o say "you cannot order us to do this, we are entitled to cancel the contract of employment and to treat your direction as a dismissal"?
In Armour guard, the answer to the question was "no". It was neither an , express nor implied tetrn of the employees' contracts that consultation take place. In IHC, however, the employer's action in breaching its employees' contracts, with the effect of immediately reducing their earnings, was held to be such a fundamental breach that it constituted a lockout under s62(l)(c). The implication of the fundamental te1111 test, and its application in IHC, seems to be that ' the more an employer's action goes to the very heart of the employee/employer relationship -that is, to their wages and conditions and other matters embodied in the employment contract -the more likely the action will be held to be a lockout and therefore, provided the action is lawful, immune from compliance orders or Further, the ability of employers to follow the example of IHC and, in effect, impose new tenus on employees, undetmines the very object of Part IV of the ECA, which establishes that employment contracts create enforc· eable rights and obligations and that the primary remedy for any breach of contract is a compliance order. Provided an employer can establish it has acted lawfully under s62(l)(c), workers can expect no relief from the Court.
Significantly, Castle J in /HC rejected the view of his , colleague Colgan J in Air New Zealand (supra). Colgan J found that the definition of lockout at s232(l)(c) of the LRA contemplated compliance with a demand that was independent of the events which constituted the breach of the contract of employment. In Air New Zealand it was held the demand and the breach were one and the same thing -that pilots be clean-shaven.
This interpretation has been aptly described as "involving a gloss to the plain words of the s62 definition of lockout" (Toogood, 1992) . Section 62(1 )(c) contemplates the act of the employer in " ... breaking some ·or all of the employer's employment contracts ... with a view to compelling any ẽmployees ... to accept tetnts of employment or comply with any demands made by the employer". There seems no suggestion from a plain r, eading of s62 that the action of the employers in IHC and Prendergast in breaking the employment contracts in a manner that corrẽsponded precisely with the demands they were making of the employees did not fall within the ambit of the section. Obviously, however, had Colgan J's analysis in Air New Zealand been correct, the climate for employers wanting to unilaterally impose changes on workers would have been considerably more hostile than it now is as a result of IHC and Prendergast.
In IHC Castle J pointed to the need only to illustrate that negotiations for a CEC were being conducted be£oiie a lockout could be lawful under s64(1)(b), and held that the bargaining s~ength of the parties and quality of the negotiations were i:nelevant to the Coun.
In fact, in the subsequent D, esignpower case (supra)., e¥en this meagre requirement appears to have been abandoned by the Court. In this case Designpower employees, aware the company wanted to feduce their redundancy entitlement prior to laying off part of its workforce, refused to negotiate for a CEC and told the company they wanted IECs. ' The company threatened to lock them out with a view to compelling them to negotiate a CEC. The employees' agent, the PSA, alleged the lockout was unlawful because it did not relate , to the negotiation of a CEC, and because it offended against s63( l)(d), which prohibits strikes and lockouts relating to the ECA' s freedom of association provisions. Colgan J held that the lockout was law~ul even though negotiations for a CEC were not underway. The action related to the negotiation of a CEC, in the sense that the company wanted to compel its employees to negotiate with it for such a contract. It was held that Parliament had not intended s64( 1 )(b) to be Iiestricted to circumstances where negotiations had actually commenced.
The PSA's allegation that the lockout threat ofiended against s5 of the ECA (which establishes the right of employees to choose whether to associate f:or the purposes of advancing their collective employment interests, and that no undue influence can be brought to bear on any person by reason of that person' 's association or lack of association with other employees) also failed. Colgan J held that s5. , as an objects section, did not confer substantive rights. It has been suggested that this decision will put employees in a strong position when dealing with employers who refuse to negotiate for a CEC. That may be so. . But the impact of the decision is nevertheless to tip the balance of bargaining power clearly in favour of employers. Designpower sanctions the use of lockouts to coerce employees to associate with one another to negotiate a CEC. Employees, however, are specifically denied the corresponding power by s63(e) of the ECA, which makes it unlawful for employees to strike with a view to compelling employers to associate together for the purpose of negotiating a CEC.
The idea of the lockout as the "minor image and quid pro quo" of the strike is further undetnrined by the Court's ruling in Hawtin v Skellerup Industrial Ltd CEC 28/92 C 8/92 16/6/92. In that case the company issued lockout notices to two workers to compel them to agree to a CEC. After one of the workers agreed to sign the contract the company proceeded to lock out the sole remaining dissident. Palmer J held that the legislation allowed the lockout of a single worker, even though the definition of lockout at s62 ~efetted to ẽmployees in the plural. It was held that there was ''no conceptual problem, either in logic or in law" presented by a lockout of one workẽr who refused to si,gn a CEC which. , by definition, must bind two or more employee parties. It did not logically follow that, because a common understanding, agfeement or concened action by employees ' Was a prerequisite to a strike, a lockout in a corresponding opposite way must extend to two ẽmployees. While strikes and lockouts were opposites, they had distinctly different constituents which were not simply the reverse of the differing ẽlements of ẽach.
At first glance the ECA may hav, e appeared to con~er some protection against coeocive lockout action under s57, which provides remedies against contracts procured by harsh and Rebecca Mactie oppressive behaviour, undue influence or duress. However, Adams and O~s v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd [1991] 2 ERNZ (CEC 22) effectively dispels this possibility. In this case it was argued employees were coerced into agreeing to new contracts by the employer's imposition of a lockout, and that this amounted to economic duress. Goddard CJ held that the lockout in question was lawful and did not amount to duress. The Chief Judge's analysis of the law on whether, in the industrial relations contẽxt, a lawful act can constitute ẽconomic dmess leaves little scope for ẽmployees to seek the shelter of s57 in the event of a lawful lockout. It was noted that the ECA did not grant immunity for lawful strikes and lockouts from proceedings under s57, as it did from proceedings in tort (s73) and from applications for injunction (s74), and that an allegation of duress arising from a lockout which may be lawful could not be dismissed out of hand by the Court and must be treated seriously. But the Court would necessarily approach such a suggestion with caution, the main reason being that Parliament had liecognised the legitimacy of strikes and lockouts in certain circumstances. To recognise lockouts as amounting to economic duress would carry the same consequence for strikes. Therefore, "there would need to be a most exceptional set of circumstances to justify [such a finding]". In holding that the facts of the Alliance case did not warrant such a finding, Goddard CJ gave a clear indication of the difficulty employees would face in seeking the protection of s57 in lawful lockout situations:
It may have been otherwise (I put it no more strongly than that) if there had been a prolonged lockout. finally bringing employees to their knees by virtually starving them into submission to the employer's demands ...
The power of the lockout: is the ECA responsible?
It has been argued that the rnc style of lockout could have occurred under the LRA and is not the result of the ECA (Birch, 1992) . The crux of this argument is that the definition of lockout is the same under the ECA as it was under the LRA. Banks (1992) , however, argues that while IHC-style lockouts could in theory have occurred under the LRA, in practice they were most unlikely given the LRA' s provision for awards and agreements to continue in force for up to three years beyond their expiry dates (s171) and the provision for awards and agreements to prevail over contracts of service in cases of conflict (sl74).
Banks' proposition calls for further development The fact that an aw~d or agreement could continue in force for up to three years beyond its expiry date did not preclude lawful strikes or lockouts ovẽr disputes of intel'est during that time. Hughes ( 1989) notes that the right to strike or lockout did not cease when the document expired. It was not unknown under the LRA for a dispute of interest to remain live for a protracted period after the document's expiry date, and therefore for the opportunity to take lawful strike or lockout action to remain open.
The reason IHC-style tactics were unknown under the LRA lies in the nature of bargaining under that regime, and in particular the nature of award bargainiflg. Technically an employer under the LRA could, in the context of a dispute of interest where the document in question had less than 60 days to run, have imposed a partial lockout under s232(1)(c). However the reality of awtlfd bargaining, whereby nominated employer and union feprẽsentatives were authorised to reach settlements which in many cases bound thousands of employers across entire industries, was that industrial action by an individual employer Take a practical example. ABC Welding is covered by the metal trades award. That award is due to ẽxpire in 60 days and the Engineers' Union has created a dispute of interest to initiate negotiations for its renewal. For its pan, ABC wants to lower its base pay rate by 1% and imposes such a cut under the auspices of s232(1)(c). ABC's employer representatives then settle the award with the union on the basis of a 2% increase in the base pay rate. By vinue of the award's subsequent parties pfovision, ABC is bound by the new document, and because the dispute is settled the lockout is no longer lawful. The end result is that ABC has achieved nothing more than a temporary lowering of its wage bill, has brought no influence to bear on the award negotiations, and has probably seriously marred its relationship with its employees . . The only circumstance in which ABC's action may have been effective would have been if it was part of a concerted and widespread campaign by other employers bound by the same award. And even then, the ability of all workers covered by the award to mount retaliatory strike action would most likely have been enough to deter employers from taking such unilateral action. However it is · Conceivable that the partial lockout could have been us· ed to effect under the LRA in the con~ext of cited party agreements, particularly enterprise deals where the ẽmployer taking the lockout action would also have been an original party to any final settlement.
The Hawtin case, too, would have been practically, if not theoretically, impossible under the LRA. Under that Iiegime unions, rather than individual workers, were parties to awards and agiieements. In principle a single employee (assuming the Labour Coun adopted the same approach as Palmer J in Haw. tin) could have been locked out in the context of a dispute of interest, but the collective nature of bargaining, whereby the focus was on the union rather than the individual wor~er, meant such action would have been fruitless (if not completely counter-productive) for the employer. Also, once the document in dispute was settled it would have been impossible for an individual Ylorker to hold out against it, so the prospect of a lawful lockout of a single employee could not have arisen.
There is another aspect to the bargaining environment created by the ECA that supports the proposition that lockouts are a more readily available and powerful tool now than they were under the LRA. The LRA, prior to the introduction of the 1990 amendment, imposed no requirement on the parties to negotiate in good faith. This was noted in A1mo.urguard (supra) in a passage adopted by Castle J in the IHC ruling to illustrate that this pe1u1issive approach still applies under the ECA:
... there is no C{)mpulsory arbitration, there is no sanction against a pany which refuses to negotiate, and it is because of these considerations that workers have been , given a limited right to strike as the only means available to compel employers to negotiate.
But in Hyndman (supra), Colgan J suggested the ECA had gone further than the LRA in this respect, by removing any "legitimate expectation" that the employer would continue to negotiate with its employees:
Although under the plievious industrial regime employees may have expected a degree of continued negotiations. under the new negotiation can include the option of declining or .refusing to negotiate or at least of coming by a process of negotiation to a fmal offer position in default of acceptance of which olller lawful options may be resorted to.
The basis of such a "legitimate expectation" under the LRA was not discussed in the ruling, but it is arguable that such an expectation ste· mmed from sections (b) and (c) of the Act's long title, namely "to provide procedures for the ofderly conduct of relations between workers and employers" and ''to provide a framework to enable agreements to be reached between workers and employers". The whole thrust of the fotmal structure of award bargaining through the compulsory conciliation process an<L in the latter stages of the LRA, the availability of limited compulsory final offer arbitration, was to facilitate settlements between unions and employers. Although voluntary agreements were settled outside the compulsory conciliation process, the Mediation Service and Arbitration Commission were nevertheless available to the parties to assist in achieving settlements.
In addition, the LRA contained a range of special powers in relation to strikes and lockouts. Section 244 granted the chief mediator powẽr to inquire into disputes in essential industries where the public interest was affected or threatened by an existing or tiueatened strike or lockout, and to attempt to settle the dispute. Section 245 gave the Ministet of Labour power in such circumstances to ask a mediator to inquire into the dispute, following which, under s246, the Labour Court could be called on to settle the disputẽ or to set out how it should be settled. Under s247 the Minister could call a conference of the parties, and if they failed to attend, the con~erence chaitn1an could make a final and binding settlement. Section 248 allow, ed the Minister to appoint a committee of inquiry into a dispute, and finally, s249 allowed a mediator to call a conference to try and settle a dispute.
With the exception of s249, these provisions wefe rarely used, but in co, mbination · with the bargaining process, were indicative of an industrial relations culture in which there prevailed an expectation of negotiation. The ECA, by contrast, has established a minimalist bargaining regime from which the Mediation Service and Arbitration Commission have been abolished, and which contains none of the special provisions in relation to strikes and lockouts listed above. As has been noted, the ECA is entirely neutral as to whether settlements are achieved and imposes neither an expectation nor an obligation on the parties to ẽmployment contracts to negotiate.
There is one final and highly significant featme of the ECA which has contributed to the emergence of the lockout as a more powerful tool than it was under the LRA. Under the LRA an employer imposing a lockout, particularly under s232(1)(a), (b) and (d), could conceivably have en1ployed alternative labour to replace the locked out employees. But provided an award or agreement was in force the employer would have had to engage those workers under the tettns of the same document that applied to the locked out wor}cjers. In other words, there would have been no immediate financial advantage to the employer in doing so. Also, as was likely, if the relevant award or agreement contained a compulsory union membership clause the replacement workers would have had to become members of the very union which was opposing the ẽmployer's demands. That union would have had exclusive bargaining rights ov, er the replacement workers. , as well as over any petinanent workers who chose to rẽturn to work on the employer's tettns. . The system petntitted little practical possibility of alternative representation to unde11nine the standing of the union ' With coverage of the site.
The ECA has changed all that Because employment contracts bind only the direct parties, employers can replace locked out (or striking) workers with cheaper labour, which, at the very least~ reduces the financial cost of n1ounting a campaign of industrial action. Unionism is now voluntary, so replacement workers need not feel the disciplinary wrath of their union officials for "scabbing" on their feHow workers. Indeed, under the ECA it is open to them to set up a rival "employee organisation A graphic example of these points was the Christchurch Carpet Yarns dispute in early 1992. In that dispute, about half the workforce re£used to agree to the employer's demands for a new CEC, and were locked out The remainder of the workforce signed the new CEC and returned to work, and replacement employees were recruited on the tenns of the new CEC to ftll in for the locked out workers. A new employee organisation was foi1ned during the lockout to represent those who were working under the new CEC. Thus the company was able to minimise the cost of the dispute, which ended when the locked out workers agreed to return to work on the employer's tettns.
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The sum total of these changes to the bargaining process is that employers, particularly in an economic climate of high unemployment which gives them ' the upper hand, can effectively exchange sincere negotiation with force by imposing changes on workers through lockouts, provided they can demonstrate they are acting lawfully within the meaning of s64.
The Minister of Labour and his officials (Department of Labour, 1992) have argued, in liesponse to alann at the implications of the IHC decision, that the law is neutral between strikes and lockouts. This comment defies the Iieality of the ẽmployment relationship. It is true that workers may breach sections of their contracts by way of strike action, just as the IHC breached parts of its contracts. But in practice the impact of the two fottns of action can never be "neutral". There is simply no circumstance in which ẽmployees could make a demand of an employer and then impose the desired change by way of strike action without themselves incurring financial loss. Only the ẽmployer is in the position of being able to make a demand and then, by exercising its control of the business, impose the change through industrial action. An employer can demand and then impose a pay cut; employees can demand a pay rise but cannot impose it Even if, for instance, employees were to demand a shoner working week and then impose it by not turning up on the hours they wanted to be relieved of, they would suffer immediate financial loss because the ẽmployer would not be obliged to pay them for those hours.
The body of case law that has developed since the ECA was introduced has ẽffectively closed off the avenues for workers to ~esist employer demands, and undetrnined their purported rights under the ECA. In particular, it has made a mockery of the Minister of Labour's assurances that employees' contracts could not be unilaterally changed by employers. As IHC and Prendergast hav, e shown, employers can do just that, pfovided they select the cin:umstances in which they act to ensure the legality of the move.
The Minister of Labour has defended the ECA and the recent case law on lockouts with the comment that "employers regard lockouts as an action to be taken only in the last tesort ... lockouts, including partial lockouts, havẽ the potẽntial to seriously damage employee/employer relationships" (Birch, 1992) , and that strikes or lockouts are generally taken by one party or the other as a shon tet , rn measure. ' These comments are based on the expectation of reasonable industrial relations behaviour, which allows the Minister to evade the reality that the new regime has opened up eno1n1ous po1ential for employers to lawfully force their will on their ẽmployees. What needs to be addressed is not how the parties in industrial relations ought to behave, but the scope for unreasonable and unfair behaviour that the legislation tolerates.
In this respect, it is suggested the following changes would go some way to restoring
